Untitled (Newark): photo by Joshua Perez (StrangeGoodness), 1 February 2014
14.7.16. Man cannot make himself happy without more ado. Whoever lives in the present lives without fear and hope.
Chinatown #2 (New York City): photo by Jim Rohan, 9 February 2014
21.7.16. What really is the situation of the human will? I will call "will" first and foremost the bearer of good and evil. Let us imagine a man who could use none of his limbs and hence could, in the ordinary sense, not exercise his will. He could, however, think and want and communicate his thoughts to someone else. Could therefore do good or evil through the other man. Then it is clear that ethics would have validity for him, too, and that he in the ethical sense is the bearer of a will.
Untitled (Newark): photo by Joshua Perez (StrangeGoodness), 28 December 2013
Now is there any difference in principle between this will and that which sets the human body in motion? Or is the mistake here this: even wanting (thinking) is an activity of the will? (And in this sense, indeed, a man without will would not be alive.) But can we conceive a being that isn't capable of Will at all, but only of Idea (of seeing for example)? In some sense this seems impossible. But if it were possible then there could also be a world without ethics.
Perfumes (Chinatown, New York City): photo by Jim Rohan, 8 February 2014
24.7.16. The World and Life are one. Physiological life is of course not "Life". And neither is psychological life. Life is the world. Ethics does not treat of the world. Ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic. Ethics and aesthetics are one.
Untitled (Newark): photo by Joshua Perez (StrangeGoodness), 30 January 2014
29.7.16. For it is a fact of logic that wanting does not stand in any logical connexion with its own fulfilment. And it is also clear that the world of the happy is a different world from the world of the unhappy.
Untitled: photo by Alyona Surikot, 9 February 2014
Is seeing an activity? Is it possible to will good, to will evil, and not to will? Or is only he happy who does not will? "To love one's neighbour" means to will! But can one want and yet not be unhappy if the want does not attain fulfilment? (And this possibility always exists.)
Brooklyn Bride #3: photo by Jim Rohan, 7 February 2014
Is it, according to common conceptions, good to want nothing for one's neighbour, neither good nor evil? And yet in a certain sense it seems that not wanting is the only good. Here I am still making crude mistakes! No doubt of that!
Cities of Tomorrow #2 (New York City): photo by Jim Rohan, 6 February 2014
It is generally assumed that it is evil to want someone else to be unfortunate. Can this be correct? Can it be worse than to want him to be fortunate? Here everything seems to turn, so to speak, on how one wants. It seems one can't say anything more than: Live happily! The world of the happy is a different world from that of the unhappy. The world of the happy is a happy world. Then can there be a world that is neither happy nor unhappy?
Elasticity #1 (Ink transfer to Arches 88 paper using Purell hand sanitizer and instant coffee): photo by Jim Rohan, 11 February 2014
30.7.16. When a general ethical law of the form "Thou shalt . . ." is set up, the first thought is: Suppose I do not do it? But it is clear that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward. So this question about the consequences of an action must be unimportant. At least these consequences cannot be events. For there must be something right about that question after all. There must be a kind of ethical reward and of ethical punishment but these must be involved in the action itself. And it is also clear that the reward must be something pleasant, the punishment something unpleasant.
Circles and rectangles: photo by efo, 4 January 2014
I keep on coming back to this! simply the happy life is good, the unhappy bad. And if I now ask myself: But why should I live happily?, then this of itself seems to me to be a tautological question; the happy life
seems to be justified, of itself, it seems that it is the only right life.
Depth Map (El Cerrito, California): photo by efo, 8 February 2014
But this is really in some sense deeply mysterious! It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed! But we could say: The happy life seems to be in some sense more harmonious than the unhappy. But in what sense?? What is the objective mark of the happy, harmonious life? Here it is again clear that there cannot be any such mark, that can be described. This mark cannot be a physical one but only a metaphysical one, a transcendental one. Ethics is transcendental.
Reality and fiction (Stockholm): photo by Jimmy Dovholt, 25 November 2010
1.8.16. How things stand, is God. God is, how things stand. Only from the consciousness of the uniqueness of my life arises religion — science — and art.
Yummy Garden Chinese Restaurant, Portland: photo by Austin Granger, 12 February 2014
2.8.16. And this consciousness is life itself. Can there be any ethics if there is no living being but myself? If ethics is supposed to be something fundamental, there can. If I am right, then it is not sufficient for the ethical judgment that a world is given. Then the world in itself is neither good nor evil.
Electricity (El Cerrito, California): photo by efo, 8 February 2014
For it must be all one, as far as concerns the existence of ethics, whether there is living matter in the world or not. And it is clear that a world in which there is only dead matter is in itself neither good nor evil, so even the world of living things can in itself be neither good nor evil. Good and evil only enter through the subject. And the subject is not part of the world, but a boundary of the world. It would be possible to say (a la Schopenhauer): It is not the world of Idea that is either good or evil; but the willing subject.
Development, Woodburn, Oregon: photo by Austin Granger, 12 February 2014
I am conscious of the complete unclarity of all these sentences. Going by the above, then, the willing subject would have to be happy or unhappy, and happiness and unhappiness could not be part of the world.
Trash bagman outside Shattuck Theater (Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley): photo by George Kelly (allaboutgeorge), 16 October 2011
As the subject is not a part of the world but a presupposition of its existence, so good and evil are predicates of the subject, not properties in the world. Here the nature of the subject is completely veiled.
Surveillance camera and shadow, Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley: photo by Jeremy Brooks, 30 August 2010
My work has extended from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world. from Ludwig Wittgenstein: Notebooks 1914-1916, ed. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, with an English translation by G. E. M. Anscombe, 1961
Ticket Booth, Canby, Oregon: photo by Austin Granger, 12 February 2014